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Abstract
How does tourism affect conflict, and how is it affected by conflict and violence? 
Tourism is often proposed as a way to manage and resolve conflicts, especially 
those between close neighbors. Drawing on theories of economic cooperation and 
conflict, and using data from the Israeli-Palestinian case, this paper finds no strong 
evidence that tourism has a pacifying effect on conflict: regions that host more tour-
ists, and that have a stronger tourism potential, are not more peaceful than other 
regions. Furthermore, hosting more tourists from the other side of the border does 
not affect violence. Finally, although tourism is sensitive to violence, this sensitivity 
is short-term and often conditional on other factors. These findings suggest that we 
should moderate our expectations about the potential effect of tourism on conflict 
resolution.
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“What I have seen is that peace works better than conflict, and one of the best 
manifestations of it is in travel and tourism”1 
How does tourism affect conflict? Can cross-border tourism contribute to 
conflict resolution and peace building, as the quote above suggests? It is a well-
established empirical regularity that tourism is adversely affected by conflict and 
violence. However, the effect of tourism on conflict, and especially the role of tour-
ism in promoting conflict resolution has been under-explored.2 In this paper, I 
use data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to examine the effect of tourism on 
patterns of conflict and violence, and to test several hypotheses about the relation-
ship between cross-border flows of people and conflict. Specifically, I explore how 
tourism is associated with the patterns of suicide attacks initiated by Palestinians 
against Israeli civilian targets. I also explore hypotheses about the sensitivity of 
tourism to violence.
A dominant view in the literature as well as in policy circles maintains that 
conflict and tourism are substitute phenomena. This view is based on the assump-
tion that people prefer traveling to peaceful destinations, where their risk of expo-
sure to violence is low, and where they can easily access tourist attractions or reach 
their destination in a predictable manner. Thus, conflict is believed to have a nega-
tive effect on cross border movement of people.
Causality, however, can also run in the opposite direction. Since cross border 
flows of people often generate revenues, they may also increase the opportunity 
cost of conflict, thereby making violence more costly and less likely. Moreover, 
revenues generated by cross border flows of people improve the local economy, 
and improved economic conditions are negatively related to some forms of vio-
lence, such as civil wars (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel, 
Satyanath, & Sergenti (2004). For these reasons, investment in tourism is often 
being proposed as an indirect way to manage and even resolve conflicts.3 Thus, the 
negative correlation between tourism and conflict can be due to the negative effect 
1  Former US President Bill Clinton at the 13th annual World Travel & Tourism Council Global Summit in 
Abu Dhabi, UAE, April 9, 2013, http://www.wttc.org/events/abudhabi-2013/global-summit-news/day-
one/presidential-prospective (Retrieved on September 21, 2013).
2  As I will discuss below, there are many studies that theoretically explore the role of economic exchang-
es, cross-border movement, and tourism in promoting cooperation. However, very little empirical evi-
dence has been provided to demonstrate the pacifying role of these exchanges. For example, Enders and 
Sandler (1991) find no effect of tourism on conflict between 1970 and 1988 using data from Spain.
3  The US Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized the role of tourism in promoting peace in the Middle 
East in his address in the World Economic Forum in Jordan on May 26, 2013, http://www.weforum.org/
news/kerry-announces-us4-billion-economic-plan-break-israeli-palestinian-impasse (Retrieved on Sep-
tember 21, 2013).
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of tourism on conflict, and not just the negative effect of conflict on tourism.
Despite the logical appeal and the evidence that tourism and conflict are sub-
stitutes, there is also evidence that conflict and tourism can be complementary. 
Terrorists often strike popular and crowded locations to maximize the impact of 
their attacks, and sometimes they specifically target tourists. Thus, an increase in 
tourism can also lead to an increase in terrorism, especially if it is directed against 
foreigners and tourists.4 Additionally, there is evidence that some types of tourists 
are attracted to areas of conflict precisely because of the risks involved in travel-
ing to these destinations or because they are interested in understanding these 
conflicts.5 Thus, conflict may not necessarily affect the overall level of cross border 
flows, but instead the type of travelers.
In this paper, I explore several hypotheses about the relationship between 
tourism and terrorism using data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I use a fine-
grained dataset that contains monthly and geographically-disaggregated data on 
tourist arrivals in Israel and the Palestinian Authority (West Bank and Gaza strip), 
as well as locations of terrorist attacks conducted by Palestinians against Israeli 
targets, and the attackers’ geographic origin.
Overall, I find little evidence that cross-border movement of tourists decreases 
conflict. Initially, there is a negative association at the macro-level between prior 
tourist flows and current attacks, consistent with the dominant view of tourism and 
conflict as substitutes. However, this association disappears at the micro-level, and 
after controlling for alternative explanations for attacks. Specifically, I find that Pal-
estinian regions that have greater tourist potential do not differ from other regions 
in the number of suicide attacks launched from their territory. Likewise, Palestin-
ian regions that host more tourists are not more peaceful compared to regions that 
host fewer tourists. Furthermore, religious holidays that are associated with tourist 
arrivals do not seem to affect the patterns of violence, not even when it comes to 
regions with religious sites.
My findings also indicate that under some conditions tourism is sensitive to 
violence. First, I find that tourism in Israel decreases by 3% to 7% in the month fol-
lowing a suicide attack, however this effect lasts only for one month and dissipates 
afterwards. Attacks in Israel affect all Israeli touristic destinations, and not only the 
cities in which these attacks take place (thus there is no local effect of terrorism on 
4  The Luxor massacre in Egypt in 1997 that killed 62 people, most of whom were tourists, is a case in 
point.
5  Tourists traveling to Syria and Afghanistan, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/ 
01/03/war-tourism-a-thrill-seeking-japanese-trucker-in-syria/ (Retrieved on September 21, 2013). Alter-
native Tourism Group in the Israeli-Palestinian context, http://electronicintifada.net/content/visit-pales-
tine-says-west-banks-growing-alternative-tourism-industry/8343 (Retrieved on September 21, 2013).
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tourism). Tourist arrivals in Palestinian territories, however, are less sensitive to at-
tacks against Israelis. The effect of terrorist attacks on tourism is conditional on Is-
raeli countermeasures against Palestinians: tourism in Palestinian regions decreases 
only when Israel uses military force in response to suicide attacks by Palestinians. 
Without such countermeasures, tourist arrivals in Palestinian areas are not associ-
ated with suicide attacks against Israelis that originate from these areas. Taken to-
gether, my findings suggest caution in response to claims that tourism can be useful 
for managing and resolving cross-border conflicts.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly outline the 
historical background of the Israeli-Palestinian case. Then, I review literature on 
economic ties and conflict, and formulate eight hypotheses about the expected 
relationship between tourism and patterns of violence. Afterwards, I describe the 
data and the empirical strategy. Then, I present the empirical results, and conclude 
with a discussion of the potential role of tourism in solving cross-border conflicts.
Historical Context: Tourism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza strip (WBG) during the Six Days War in 
1967, and imposed a military rule in these territories. Figure 1 shows a map of 
Israel and the WBG. The light gray areas represent the pre-1967 Israeli territory, 
and the darker grey areas show the Palestinian regions (also labeled North, Middle, 
Jerusalem, South, and Gaza).
Following the first Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in 1987, Israel started ne-
gotiating with the Palestinian leadership, and signed the Oslo accords in 1993, 
followed by several interim agreements. The basic principle underlying these agree-
ments was the land for peace formula: Israel agreed to withdraw from part of the 
lands it occupied in 1967 in exchange for the Palestinian recognition of Israel’s 
right to exist and their cooperation in counterterrorism against the hardline Pales-
tinian organizations. 
Although the interim agreements have not led to the establishment of a Pales-
tinian state, they allowed the Palestinians for the first time to control parts of the 
disputed territory, and establish an administrative infrastructure to govern these 
areas. The territory that came under Palestinian control includes the cities of Beth-
lehem, Hebron, and Jericho that contain many sites of religious and historical im-
portance. Other areas in the Palestinian territories, such as the city of Ramallah as 
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well as Gaza strip also have touristic potential.6 
Israel hosts numerous sites that attract many tourists from around the world—
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, the Dead Sea, and the Gulf of Eilat (see Figure 1).7 
Despite the initial progress in the 1990s, talks over the permanent agreement 
between Israel and the Palestinians came to a halt in 2000. Violence had resumed 
with the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, and the subsequent 
wave of suicide attacks that targeted Israeli cities until the end of December 2006. 
Israel has used military force, as well as targeted assassinations, house demolitions, 
and curfews, whereas the Palestinians resorted to terror attacks, including suicide 
bombings. According to the Israel Security Agency, there were about 30,000 Pales-
tinian attacks against Israeli targets between September 2000 and December 2006 
that resulted in over 1,000 Israeli fatalities.
6  Palestinian official website describes several places with touristic potential: http://travelpalestine.ps/des-
tinations/ (Retrieved on September 21, 2013).
7  See Israeli official website, http://www.goisrael.com/Tourism_Eng/Pages/home.aspx (Retrieved on Sep-
tember 21, 2013).
Figure 1
Map of Israel and the Palestinian Regions with Main Touristic Sites
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Figure 2 shows the number of suicide attacks conducted by Palestinians 
against Israeli targets. Suicide attacks peaked in March 2002, and became signifi-
cantly less frequent afterwards.
Tourism in Palestinian areas and in Israel surged in the wake of the Oslo ac-
cords and the peace talks, but steeply declined after the eruption of violence. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 depict the changes in tourist arrivals in Palestinian and in Israeli 
hotels, respectively. The number of tourists staying in Palestinian hotels has plum-
meted following the outbreak of the second Intifada, and has never recovered to 
its previous level. There has been a slight recovery since 2004, but it is due mostly 
to domestic tourism, as shown by the solid line (total number of tourists) and the 
dashed line (foreign tourists) in Figure 3. Israel has also experienced a decline in 
Figure 2
Suicide Attacks Carried Out by Palestinians against Israeli Targets
Figure 3
Hotel Guests in Palestinian Regions
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foreign tourist arrivals, but the overall number of tourists has remained largely 
the same due to domestic tourism, as shown by the solid line in Figure 4. Foreign 
tourist arrivals have been recovering since 2003, but the overall number has not 
returned to the pre-Intifada levels, as depicted by the dashed line in Figure 4.
Tourism and Conflict: Extant Literature and Hypotheses
The Effect of Tourism on Conflict
The relationship between tourism and conflict is situated within a broader context 
of the effect of economic ties on political conflict. The extant literature in this area 
offers three alternative views: One perspective asserts that cross-border economic 
exchanges inhibit conflict, leading to a more peaceful world. A second view holds 
that economic exchanges are positively associated with conflict because they gener-
ate discord between countries. A third argument posits that economic ties do not 
affect conflict, and that the apparent correlation is spurious.
The argument that economic ties reduce conflict is associated with the liberal 
approach to international relations, and it has gained prominence in both academic 
and policy circles, as the quote in the beginning of this paper suggests. This per-
spective traces back to Immanuel Kant, who envisioned free trade to be one of the 
key ingredients to a world peace (Crescenzi, 2005). Several studies find an empiri-
cal support for the pacific impact of cross-border economic exchanges (Domke, 
1988; Mansfield, 1994; Polanchek, 1978; Oneal & Russet, 1997; cited in Mansfield 
& Pollins, 2003; and in Crescenzi, 2005). Some of these findings have been called 
Figure 4
Hotel Guests in Israel 
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into question, among other things based on methodological grounds (Beck, Katz, 
& Tucker, 1998).
One explanation for the pacifying effect of economic exchanges suggests that 
as such exchanges intensify, potential belligerents become better positioned to 
achieve their political goals using other, nonviolent means, thereby making military 
conquest and territorial expansion unnecessary (Rosencrance, 1986). Cross-border 
tourism in particular has been linked to economic stability, development of infra-
structure, foreign currency earning, and an increase in employment, all of which 
contribute to a greater satisfaction with the status quo, and reduce the incentives 
to engage in conflict. Applying this argument to the Israeli-Palestinian context sug-
gests that we should expect less violence by Palestinians following periods of higher 
tourist inflows, since tourism revenues are expected to boost the economy, make 
Palestinians more satisfied with the status quo, and less likely to resort to violence.
Hypothesis 1: Fewer Palestinian attacks against Israelis are expected in period 
t if Palestinians host more tourists in period t-1. 
An additional reason for their pacifying effect is that economic exchanges 
generate revenue for individuals and groups that develop vested interest in main-
taining the status quo, and avoiding situations that can disrupt future flow of in-
come. These groups restrain their governments from using force because conflict 
reduces revenue from cross-border economic exchange (Mansfield & Pollins, 2003; 
Domke, 1988; cited in Crescenzi, 2005). 
In the Israeli-Palestinian context, Bueno de Mesquita (2009) proposes an ar-
rangement involving tourism that would provide incentives to both sides to avoid 
violence. In this arrangement, Israel and the Palestinians would share tax revenue 
from tourism in a way that would enhance income for both sides, and in the case of 
the Palestinians this mechanism might result in a ninefold increase in tax revenue. 
Since tourism is sensitive to violence, both sides would lose if the conflict reignites. 
Thus, both Israel and the Palestinians, under this arrangement, would have strong 
incentives to maintain stability and avoid escalation in order to secure tourism rev-
enue. If the argument that higher costs of losing economic ties make violence less 
likely is correct, then those who profit from tourism, and thus have vested interest 
in avoiding disruption of cross-border flows, should oppose violence, and try and 
restrain those who engage in it. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, this explanation 
would imply that Palestinian regions that benefit more from tourism should be less 
likely to contribute to violence.
Hypothesis 2: Palestinian suicide bombers are less likely to originate in period 
t from Palestinian regions that host more tourists in period t-1. 
Another causal mechanism that is suggested in the literature to explain why 
economic ties can reduce the likelihood of conflict is that economic exchanges 
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increase the frequency of interaction and communication between potential bel-
ligerents, and contribute to mutual understanding, reduce uncertainty, and ulti-
mately lower the likelihood of violence outbreak. Karl Deutsch’s research on secu-
rity communities, whose members have a “real assurance that the members of that 
community will not fight each other physically,” emphasizes transaction flows that 
incrementally lead to “mutual sympathy and localities,” and a “we feeling” (cited in 
Kupchan, 2010, pp. 22-23).
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this explanation implies that higher frequency 
of interactions between Israelis and the Palestinians, especially in the context of 
economic exchanges, should lower the likelihood of violence by increasing mutual 
understanding and reducing miscommunication. This logic implies the following 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Palestinian suicide bombers are less likely to emerge in period 
t from regions that host more Israeli tourists in period t-1.
A number of studies have asserted various domestic and international factors 
mediate the effect of economic exchanges on conflict.8 In the Israeli-Palestinian 
context, religious holidays could be a mediating factor that shapes the impact of 
tourism on conflict. Religious tourism is especially important in the context of 
Israel and the Palestinian regions, and thus it is logical to suggest that the effect of 
dependence on tourism might be contingent on proximity to religious holidays, 
and that Palestinians are less likely to initiate attacks prior to such holidays in order 
to avoid losing revenue from tourism. This should be especially true for Palestin-
ian regions with religious sites, such as the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. This 
implies the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Palestinians from regions with religious sites are less likely to 
initiate attacks against Israelis before Christian holidays.
The Sensitivity of Tourism to Conflict
 One of the arguments in favor of the pacifying effect of tourism on conflict is that 
tourism is sensitive to violence, and parties have an incentive to avoid fighting 
to preserve tourism revenue. The tax revenue sharing arrangement proposed by 
Bueno de Mesquita (2009) and discussed earlier rests on the premise that tourism 
8  For example, Mansfield (2004) posits that economic ties inhibit conflict only in the presence of pref-
erential trade arrangements. Liberman (1999) reports that the effect of economic ties on conflict is 
conditional on the offense-defense balance. Papayoanou (1996) and Hegre (2000) show that domestic 
characteristics (such as the effect of the economic interests on policy-making and the level of industrial 
development) affect the role of economic interdependence in preventing conflict.
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is sensitive to violence, and that tax revenues would decrease if violence erupts, 
thus leading both sides to lose. Bueno de Mesquita provides some evidence that 
tourist arrivals decrease both in Israel and in Palestinian regions following terrorist 
attacks, but this evidence is based on data that are aggregated both spatially as well 
as temporally. 
Several other studies provide evidence of the negative effect of conflict on tour-
ism. Enders and Sandler (1991) find a significant negative effect of terrorism on the 
number of tourists visiting Spain from 1970 through 1988 using monthly data and 
a vector autoregressive analysis. Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992) report a nega-
tive effect of terrorism on tourism in Greece, Austria, and Italy from 1974 through 
1988. Moreover, using data from Western Europe they report that tourist substitute 
away from countries that experience attacks to other, more peaceful countries. Pit-
zam and Fleischer (2009) report an adverse effect of terrorism on tourism based on 
data from Israel between 1991 and 2001. They note that the frequency of attacks, 
rather than their lethality, is the best predictor of tourism decline. In a more recent 
study, Enders and Sandler (2006) find that both domestic and international ter-
rorism adversely affected foreign tourism to Italy between 1995 and 1997. Finally, 
using data from Greece, Israel, and Turkey, Drakos and Kutan (2003) also find 
evidence that tourists substitute away from high-risk places. Unlike other studies, 
Yaya (2008) finds a negative, but relatively small effect of domestic terrorism on 
tourists’ arrival in Turkey. 
The view that parties abstain from violence out of fear of losing profits from 
their economic exchange has been criticized by Barbieri and Levy (1999), who 
show that interstate wars do not always halt trade, and that conflict presents only 
short-term costs to parties that engage in trade. 
In order to investigate whether terrorism indeed imposes costs by reducing the 
number of tourists following attacks, I investigate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: Fewer tourists arrive in Israel in period t if there is a terrorist 
attack in period t-1.
Hypothesis 6: Israeli cities that experience an attack in period t-1 should have 
fewer tourists in period t.
Hypothesis 7: Fewer tourists arrive in a Palestinian region in period t if a sui-
cide bomber originated from that region in period t-1.
Finally, some studies conclude that there is no systematic relationship between 
economic exchanges and political conflict. This view is characteristic of neorealist 
approaches that maintain that the distribution of power is the key determinant of 
conflict, and that it trumps the importance of economic gains (Waltz, 1979; Buzan, 
1984; Gilpin, 1987; quoted in Crescenzi, 2005). To the extent that this argument is 
correct, we should not observe any relationship between tourism and terrorism in 
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the hypotheses specified above.
Data
The dataset contains geographically-disaggregated monthly data on tourism and 
conflict in Israel and the Palestinian territories from 1999 through 2006.
Tourism Data
To measure flows of tourists, I use data provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.9 The measure that is avail-
able for both entities is that of the number of guests staying in hotels in every Pal-
estinian region i in month t (TouristsPALi,t), and in every Israeli tourist destination j 
in month t (TouristsISRj,t). The data on guests staying in Palestinian and Israeli hotels 
is available on a monthly basis for each Palestinian region and each Israeli tourist 
destination. There is also information on the origin of the guests, and I explore this 
data in my tests.
Palestinian territories are divided into 5 regions depicted in Figure 1. The 
Israeli data covers the main tourist destinations in Israel: Jerusalem Tel Aviv, Haifa, 
Tiberias, Netanya, Herzliya, and Eilat, as well as the Dead Sea resorts that are also 
represented in Figure 1.
Conflict Data
The measure of terrorism is Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli targets. I use 
a detailed dataset, originally constructed by Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) and 
recently used in Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010), based on the annual reports 
of the Israeli Security Agency. This dataset identifies all Palestinian suicide attacks 
that were carried out from September 2000 through December 2006, and the home 
district of the perpetrators. The dataset contains 143 suicide attacks involving 157 
suicide terrorists. Based on these data, I create a variable Suicide attacksi,t that count 
the number of suicide attacks originating from each Palestinian region i in month t.
Controls Variables
I employ several control variables to account for alternative explanations for attacks 
or for tourist arrivals.
9  These data are available here: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/lang__en/507/site/688/default.aspx (Palestin-
ian data, retrieved on September 21, 2013) and here http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_
SHTML&ID=432 (Israeli data, retrieved on September 21, 2013).
60 The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies
In models where the dependent variable is attacks, I control for Palestinian 
unemployment, Palestinian population size, and Israeli settler population size in 
every Palestinian region, since these factors might affect the likelihood and the 
intensity of violence. These variables are available on an annual basis for each Pal-
estinian region. In my tests, I use the log-transformed value for Palestinian popula-
tion and settler population.
Attacks as well as tourist arrivals can be affected by proximity to religious 
holidays. Religious holidayt-1 and Religious holidayt+1 are equal to 1 if there is a re-
ligious holiday in the preceding and in the following month, respectively. These 
variables are otherwise coded 0. I consider Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religious 
holidays.10 
Another factor that might affect the likelihood and the intensity of attacks and 
tourism is proximity to elections (Aksoy, n.d.). To control for elections, I include 
two binary variables—Electiont-1 and Electiont+1 that are equal to 1 if there are elec-
tions either in Israel or in the Palestinian regions in the preceding or in the follow-
ing month, respectively. I consider parliamentary elections in Israel, as well as the 
2001 direct election of the prime minister. In the Palestinian regions, I account for 
the Palestinian Legislative Council, presidential elections, and local (municipal) 
elections.11 
Attacks and tourism are affected by developments in the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks (Kydd & Walter, 2002). I use data from the Levant Reuters CAMEO 
data collected by the Penn State Even Data Project to code positive and negative 
developments in negotiations.12 Positive event in negotiationst measures a number of 
events in month t the parties (formal Israeli and Palestinian representatives) negoti-
ated, expressed an intent to engage in cooperation, made optimistic comments, or 
provided concessions. Negative event in negotiationst counts that number of times in 
month t the parties halted negotiations, threatened to use force, imposed sanctions 
on each other, or made pessimistic comments about the prospects of the talks.
Finally, attacks and tourism can also be affected by the use of military force by
10  Christian holidays are New Year’s eve, Christmas, Ash Wednesday, and Easter, both western and Or-
thodox dates. Jewish holidays are Rosh Hashana, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, Chanuka, Purim, Pessach, and 
Shavuot. Muslim holidays are Ramadan, Eid al Fitr, Day of Arafat, and Eid al Adha. The dates of these 
holidays are available here http://www.timeanddate.com/holidays.
11  Dates of Israeli parliamentary elections: 5/17/1999, 1/28/2003, 3/28/2006. Direct prime minister elec-
tion: 2/6/2001. Palestinian presidential election was held on 1/9/2005, and Palestinian parliamentary 
election took place on 1/25/2006. Palestinian local elections were held in several rounds in the following 
months: 12/2004, 1/2005, 5/2005, 9/2005, and 12/2005.
12  The dataset is available here http://eventdata.psu.edu/data.dir/Levant.Reuters.CAMEO.1111.zip (Re-
trieved September 21, 2013).
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Israel. To control for this, I create a variable Military force by Israelt which counts the 
number of times in month t Israeli used tanks, artillery, or aerial weapons against 
the Palestinians, based on the Penn State’s Levant Reuters CAMEO data.
Empirical Method
I use a time-series cross-section dataset to explore the relationship between conflict 
and tourism.
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the following equation:
Suicide attackst = TouristsPALt-1 + Suicide attackst-1 + γXt-1 + εt, (1)
where Suicide attackst is the number of all Palestinian suicide attacks in month 
t. TouristsPALt-1 is the logged number of tourists staying in Palestinian hotels in the 
preceding month, Suicide attackst-1 is the number of Palestinian suicide attacks in 
the preceding month, and γXt-1 is a vector of control variables, as explained above. 
Finally, εt are robust standard errors.
The following equations are used to test hypothesis 2:
Suicide attacksi,t = TouristsPALi,t-1 + Suicide attacksi,t-1 + γXi,t-1 + ηt + εi,t (2)
Suicide attacksi,t = TouristsPALi,t-1+ γXi,t-1 + μi + ηt + εi,t (3)
Suicide attacksi,t is the number of suicide attacks originating from Palestinian 
region i in month t. The main independent variable is the logged total number of 
tourists in Palestinian region i in month t-1. 
Equation 2 refers to the lagged dependent variable linear model,13 and in equa-
tion 3 I include Palestinian regions fixed effects μi that capture time-invariant region 
level factors, such as topography, distance from Israel, and distance from borders. 
These region fixed effects are in leu of the lagged dependent variable. Equation 3 
also includes month dummies ηt that capture temporal trends. Finally, I allow for 
correlated errors within regions over time by clustering the regressions at the region 
level (εi,t).
Hypothesis 3 is tested using the models in equations 1 and 2, and the only dif-
ference is that the main independent variable is the logged number of tourists from 
Israel in Palestinian region i in month t-1—Israeli TouristsPALi,t-1.
To test hypothesis 4, I use the following models:
Suicide attacksi,t =  Christian holidayt+1 + Religious sitei + Christian holidayt+1 × Religious 
sitei + Suicide attacksi,t-1 + γXi,t-1 + ηt + εi,t (4)
Suicide attacksi,t =  Christian holidayt+1 + Religious sitei + Christian holidayt+1 × Religious 
sitei + γXi,t-1 + μi + ηt + εi,t (5)
13 For the discussion of analyzing time-series—cross section data, see Beck and Katz (2009).
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where Christian holidayt+1 is equal to 1 if there is a Christian religious holiday 
in the following month, and 0 otherwise. Religious sitei is equal to 1 if there is a site 
of religious importance in Palestinian region i.
The model used to test hypothesis 5 is again similar to the one in equation 1. 
The dependent variable is TouristsISRt that measures the logged number of tourists 
staying in Israeli hotels in month t, and the dependent variable is the total number 
of suicide attacks against Israelis in month t-1—Suicide attackst-1.
Finally, the models used to estimate hypotheses 6 and 7 are similar to equa-
tions 2 and 3. Here the dependent variables are TouristsISRt and TouristsPALt for hy-
pothesis 6 and hypothesis 7, respectively. The main independent variable is Suicide 
attacksi,t-1 that measures the number of suicide attacks in city i in month t-1 for 
hypotheses 6, and the number of suicide attacks originating from Palestinian region 
i in month t-1 for hypothesis 7.
Results
Does Tourism Reduce Conflict?
I start the empirical tests by asking whether Palestinian attacks are affected by the 
tourist arrivals in Palestinian regions in the previous period. Results are presented 
in Table 1. The unit of analysis in this test is month. The dependent variable is the 
logged number of suicide attacks initiated by Palestinians against Israelis in month 
t.14 The main independent variable is TouristsPALt-1 that is equal to the logged num-
ber of guests staying in all Palestinian hotels in a preceding month. 
I begin with a simple linear regression of the number of attacks on the logged 
number of tourists, including a lagged dependent variable to account for temporal 
dependence,15 and month dummies to address secular trends. The results in column 
1 suggest that past tourism is negatively associated with present number of suicide 
attacks. Existing literature suggests that economic conditions are an important po-
tential determinant of violence. To ascertain whether these results are affected by 
changes in the economy, in column 2, I control for the Palestinian unemployment 
14  I logged the number of attacks and added 1 to transform it to a continuous variable suitable for an OLS 
regression. The other alternative would be to use a count model to accommodate a count dependent 
variable (number of attacks), but such model would be problematic since it is a time-series dataset, and 
there is no good way of accounting for temporal dependence with a count model (see Brandt and Wil-
liams, 1998). In a robustness test (not reported here), I repeat this estimation using a probit model with 
a binary variable and binary time-series corrections as in Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), and the results 
are substantively the same as in Table 1.
15  Not including the lagged dependent variable will be equal to assuming that attacks in month t are uncor-
related with attacks in month t-1.
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Variable (1) (2) (3)
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
TouristsPALt-1 -0.55*** [0.08] 0.42*** [0.12] -0.31** [0.14]
UnemploymentPALt-1 1.86 [1.18]  4.32** [1.86]
PopulationPALt-1 -1.60 [1.66]
Settler populationt-1 -0.22 [0.15]
Religious holidayt-1 -0.11 [0.13]
Religious holidayt+1 -0.20 [0.14]
Electiont-1  0.26* [0.14]
Electiont+1 -0.08 [0.17]
Positive events in 
negotiationt-1
-0.01 [0.02]
Negative events in 
negotiationt-1
 0.00 [0.03]
Military force by Israelt-1  0.02 [0.03]
Suicide attackst-1 0.07** [0.03] 0.06** [0.03]  0.04 [0.03]
Constant 5.59*** [0.72] 4.00*** [1.28] 29.22 [23.42]
Month dummies yes yes yes
R2 0.55 0.55 0.56
No. of obs. 89 89 88
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1
Tourism and Palestinian Suicide Attacks: Pooled (Palestine)-Level Regressions (Hypothesis 1)
rate in a preceding month. The coefficient of TouristsPALt-1 is still negative and statisti-
cally significant. Finally, in column 3 I include additional control variables—prox-
imity to religious holidays and to elections, developments in the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations, and the use of force by Israel in the preceding month. The coefficient 
of TouristsPALt-1 is still negative, although its statistical significance drops from 99% to 
95%. This implies that the number of tourists is negatively associated with the num-
ber of suicide attacks originating from Palestinian regions. Substantively, since both 
the dependent and the independent variables are log-transformed, the coefficient 
implies that a 1% increase in the number of tourists in Palestinian hotels in month 
t-1 is associated with a 0.31% decrease in the number of suicide attacks in month t.
One potential problem with the results in Table 1 is that they might be driven 
by omitted variables, some of which might be unobservable, but also correlated 
with the number of tourists. Thus, these results cannot be interpreted causally. To 
further explore the relationship between tourism and conflict, I use a geographi-
cally-disaggregated dataset where the unit of analysis is Palestinian region-month. 
This allows exploration of the connection between tourism and violence, and con-
trol of alternative region-level explanations that can affect violence.
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As hypothesis 2 suggests, groups that benefit from tourism should be less 
likely to participate in conflict because they have more to lose if violence disrupts 
economic exchange. This hypothesis is tested in Table 2.
In column 1, I again start with a simple linear regression of the dependent vari-
able (suicide attacks originating from Palestinian region i in month t) on the logged 
number of guests staying in hotels in region i in month t-1. I include a lagged 
dependent variable and month dummies to account for temporal dependence and 
trends, respectively. The results suggest that there is a negative and statistically sig-
nificant relationship between tourism and the number of attacks launched in and 
from Palestinian regions. I proceed with the tests, and include control variables in 
column 2. The relationship between tourism and attacks remains negative, though 
the level of statistical significance drops from 95% to 90%. The coefficient size is 
also smaller. Finally, in column 3 I include also region fixed effect to control for 
time-invariant observable and unobservable region-level characteristics (and drop 
the lagged dependent variable). The statistical significance no longer holds, and the 
coefficient size becomes much smaller.
This suggests that the initial negative association between tourism and vio-
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
TouristsPALi,t-1 -0.09** [0.02] -0.05* [0.02] -0.01 [0.04]
UnemploymentPALi,t-1  1.13 [0.61]  2.30 [1.32]
PopulationPALi,t-1  0.08 [0.07] -1.00 [0.63]
Settler populationi,t-1  0.04* [0.02]  0.01* [0.00]
Religious holidayt-1 -0.05 [0.03] -0.05 [0.04]
Religious holidayt+1 -0.09 [0.08] -0.08 [0.07]
Electiont-1  0.04 [0.07]  0.05 [0.05]
Electiont+1 -0.03 [0.06] -0.03 [0.08]
Positive events in negotiationt-1  0.00 [0.01] -0.00 [0.01]
Negative events in negotiationt-1 -0.00 [0.00]  0.00 [0.00]
Military force by Israelt-1  0.01 [0.01]  0.01 [0.01]
Suicide attacksi,t-1  0.30** [0.10]  0.22** [0.05]
Constant  0.73** [0.18] -1.09 [1.09] 12.99 [8.02]
Month dummies  yes yes yes
Region fixed effects  no no yes
R2  0.26 0.31 0.20
No. of obs.  440 440 440
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 2
Tourism in Palestinian Regions and Palestinian Suicide Attacks Originating from These 
Regions: Region-Level Regressions (Hypothesis 2)
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lence disappears once we control for region-level time-invariant factors, such as 
terrain and distance from borders and Israel, as well as other unobservable time-
invariant region-level factors. When we account for an alternative explanation, it 
seems that previous violence trends and the size of the settler population in a Pal-
estinian region are better predictors of suicide attacks than tourism. Based on the 
results in Table 2, I reject hypothesis 2.
I now turn to examine whether Palestinian regions hosting more Israeli tour-
ists are less likely to be home-regions of suicide bombers (hypothesis 3). Results 
are reported in Table 3. Column 1, as before, shows a simple linear regression with 
lagged dependent variable and month dummies. The results suggest a negative 
correlation between Israeli tourists in a Palestinian region in month t-1 and suicide 
attacks launched from that region or attacks in that region against Israelis in month 
t. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of control variables and region 
fixed effects in columns 2 and 3—the coefficient of interest remains negative, but 
it is no longer significant. As before, the lagged dependent variable and the demo-
graphic variables are better predictors of where suicide bombers are more likely to 
originate from. Despite the initial appearance, there is no evidence that Palestinian
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Israeli TouristsPALi,t-1 -0.04*** [0.01] -0.01* [0.01] -0.01 [0.03]
UnemploymentPALi,t-1 1.16 [0.71] 2.31 [1.39]
PopulationPALi,t-1 0.12 [0.06] -1.10* [0.41]
Settler populationi,t-1 0.04* [0.02] 0.01* [0.01]
Religious holidayt-1 -0.05 [0.03] -0.05 [0.04]
Religious holidayt+1 -0.09 [0.07] -0.08 [0.07]
Electiont-1 0.04 [0.07] 0.05 [0.05]
Electiont+1 -0.04 [0.06] -0.02 [0.07]
Positive events in negotiationt-1 0.00 [0.01] -0.00 [0.01]
Negative events in negotiationt-1 -0.00 [0.01] -0.00 [0.00]
Military force by Israelt-1 0.02 [0.01] 0.01 [0.01]
Suicide attacksi,t-1 0.34** [0.11] 0.24*** [0.04]
Constant 0.25** [0.07] -1.91 [1.00] 14.22 [5.28]
Month dummies yes yes yes
Region fixed effects no no yes
R2 0.23 0.31 0.20
No. of obs. 445 440 440
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3
Israeli Tourism in Palestinian Regions and Palestinian Suicide Attacks Originating from 
These Regions: Region-Level Regressions (Hypothesis 3)
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 regions hosting more tourists from Israel are less likely to be home-bases for sui-
cide bombers. I, therefore, reject hypothesis 3.
I now turn to test hypotheses 4, according to which there should be fewer sui-
cide attacks coming from Palestinian regions that have religious sites prior to Chris-
tian holidays. Table 4 reports the results of this hypothesis test. I do not include 
region fixed effects here because I am interested in the effect of having a religious site 
(a fixed effect) on attacks. I include a lagged dependent variable to account for time 
dependence. The dependent variable is the number of suicide attacks that originate 
from Palestinian region i in month t. The main independent variables are Religious 
sitei, Christian holidayt+1, and the interaction of the two. The effect of a Christian holi-
day, conditional on having a religious site, is the sum of the coefficients of Christian 
holidayt+1 and the interaction term Religious sitei × Christian holidayt+1.
Column 1 suggests that a month prior to a Christian holiday is not less peace-
ful in terms of suicide attacks originating from Palestinian regions (the coefficient 
is positive, though not statistically significant). Furthermore, a month prior to a 
Christian holiday is also not less violence in Palestinian regions with Christian reli-
Variable (1) (2)
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Religious sitei -0.09 [0.08] -0.06 [0.05]
Christian holidayt+1  0.04 [0.08] -0.04 [0.10]
Religious sitei x Christian -0.02 [0.05] -0.02 [0.06]
holidayt+1 
UnemploymentPALi,t-1  1.22 [0.58]
PopulationPALi,t-1  0.13 [0.06]
Settler Populationi,t-1  0.04* [0.02]
Electiont-1  0.04 [0.06]
Electiont+1 -0.05 [0.07]
Positive events in negotiationt-1  0.00 [0.00]
Negative events in negotiationt-1  0.00 [0.00]
Military force by Israelt-1  0.02 [0.01]
Suicide attacksi,t-1  0.40** [0.10]  0.23*** [0.03]
Constant  0.12** [0.08] -2.25 [0.86]
Month dummies  yes  yes
Region fixed effects  no  no
R2  0.17  0.26
No. of obs.  440  440
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4
Religious Sites, Christian Holidays, and Palestinian Suicide Attacks: Region-Level 
Regressions (Hypothesis 4)
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gious sites that are frequented by tourists. This result does not change when control 
variables are added in column 2. I, therefore reject hypothesis 4.
To summarize my findings so far—despite the initial results that suggested a 
negative relationship between tourism in month t-1 and suicide attacks in month t, 
this relationship disappears when we control for additional explanations.
Does Conflict Affect Tourism?
I now turn to examine whether tourism is sensitive to violence. Table 5 reports the 
results of a linear regression of tourists staying in Israeli hotels in month t on the 
number of suicide attacks in Israel in month t-1. The regression includes control 
variables, a lagged dependent variable, and month dummies. The results provide 
support for the argument that tourism is affected by terrorism. There is a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between the number of tourists and suicide 
attacks in the preceding month, except for domestic tourism that does not seem 
to be affected by terrorism.16 Specifically, one suicide attack decreases the overall 
number of tourists in the next month by 3%, the number of foreign tourists by 
7%, and the number of tourists from the Americas and Europe by 6% and 7%, 
Variable Total Foreign Domestic
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Suicide attackst-1 -0.03*** [0.01] -0.07*** [0.02]  0.01 [0.02]
Religious holidayt-1 -0.08* [0.04]  0.03 [0.10] -0.04 [0.04]
Religious holidayt+1 -0.03 [0.04] -0.19* [0.10] -0.01 [0.05]
Electiont-1 -0.01 [0.05] -0.09 [0.12]  0.05 [0.05]
Electiont+1   0.03 [0.04]  0.14 [0.11] -0.00 [0.05]
Positive events in negotiationt-1  0.01* [0.01]  0.02* [0.02] -0.02*** [0.01]
Negative events in negotiationt-1 -0.02** [0.01] -0.04** [0.02] -0.00 [0.01]
Military force by Israelt-1 -0.01 [0.01] -0.01 [0.02]  0.01 [0.01]
US global tourismt-1  0.00** [0.00]  0.00 [0.00]  0.00 [0.00]
TouristsISRt-1 -0.02 [0.02]  0.66*** [0.08]  0.03 [0.03]
Constant 12.73** [0.34]  4.41*** [0.78] 12.06*** [0.35]
Month dummies yes  yes yes
R2 0.64  0.71 0.65
No. of obs. 88  88 88
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5
Suicide Attacks and Tourism in Israel: State-Level Regressions (Hypothesis 5)
16  I also tested the sensitivity of tourism to terrorism fatalities. The results are substantively similar: one 
fatality due to suicide terrorism reduces the number of tourists by 1% in the following month. Domestic 
tourism in Israel is not affected by terrorism fatalities.
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Variable Coef. Std. err.
Suicide attackt-1 -0.03** [0.01]
Suicide attackt-2  0.01 [0.01]
Suicide attackt-3  0.01 [0.01]
Suicide attackt-4 -0.01 [0.02]
Suicide attackt-5  0.0 [0.01]
Suicide attackt-6 -0.01 [0.01]
Religious holidayt-1 -0.06 [0.05]
Religious holidayt+1 -0.04 [0.04]
Electiont-1 -0.02 [0.06]
Electiont+1   0.02 [0.04]
Positive events in negotiationt-1  0.01 [0.01]
Negative events in negotiationt-1 -0.02 [0.01]
Military force by Israelt-1 -0.02** [0.01]
US global tourismt-1  0.00 [0.00]
TouristsISRt-1  0.05 [0.03]
Constant 12.01*** [0.46]
Month dummies yes
R2 0.64
No. of obs. 83
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6
Suicide Attacks and Tourism in Israel: State-Level Regressions (Hypothesis 5)
respectively.17 
The effect of violence on tourism does not depend only on the immediate as-
sociation between these variables, but also on how long-lasting this association is. 
I explore this in Table 6, where I regress the number of tourists staying in Israeli 
hotels in month t on the number of attacks in month t-1 through t-6. The results 
show that there is an immediate negative association between the number of sui-
cide attacks and subsequent number of tourists. However, this relationship dis-
sipates after one month. Two months after a suicide attack the number of tourists 
goes back to its normal level.
Based on the results in Tables 5 and 6, I conclude that there is evidence in 
favor of the argument that tourism and terrorism are substitutes. However, the 
negative relationship lasts for a very short period. I therefore accept hypothesis 5, 
17  The dependent variable is log transformed, and the main independent variable is in its original form—
the number of suicide attacks. The interpretation of the coefficient is thus one unit change in the in-
dependent variable (one attack) is associated with 100 × coefficient percent change in the dependent 
variable (see Wooldridge, 2003, p. 187).
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Variable (1) (2)
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Local suicide attackt-1 -0.02 [0.03] -0.06 [0.03]
National suicide attackt-1 -0.03*** [0.00] -0.06** [0.02]
Religious holidayt-1 -0.03 [0.02] -0.08* [0.04]
Religious holidayt+1 -0.08** [0.03] -0.06*** [0.01]
Electiont-1  -0.05** [0.02] -0.05 [0.05]
Electiont+1   0.02 [0.01]  0.03 [0.04]
Positive events in negotiationt-1 -0.00 [0.00]  0.02* [0.01]
Negative events in negotiationt-1  0.00 [0.01] -0.03*** [0.01]
Military force by Israelt-1 -0.00 [0.00] -0.01 [0.01]
US global tourismt-1 -0.39*** [0.04]  0.39 [0.18]
TouristsISRt-1  0.96*** [0.01]
Constant  6.21*** [0.71]  4.66 [2.59]
Month dummies  yes  yes
Region fixed effects  no  yes
R2  0.94  0.45
No. of obs.  392  392
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 7
Suicide Attacks and Tourism in Israel: City-Level Regressions (Hypothesis 6)
and now turn to explore this relationship using a geographically-disaggregated data 
on Israeli cities hosting tourists.
Table 7 reports the results of two linear regressions of the logged number of 
tourists staying in Israeli hotels in month t on the number of suicide attacks in 
month t-1, both at the local level (attacks in city i in month t), as well as at the 
national level (all suicide attacks in Israel in month t). Column 1 reports the results 
of a linear model with controls, a lagged dependent variable, and month dummies, 
and column 2 reports the results of the same model, but with city fixed effects in-
stead of the lagged dependent variable. In both models, local and national attacks 
have a negative association with the subsequent number of tourists, but only the 
relationship with attacks on the national level is statistically significant at accept-
able levels. The implication is that an attack in city j affects city i to the same extent 
as if it happened in city i. In substantive terms, a suicide attack anywhere in Israel 
leads to a decrease of 3% or 6% (depending on the model) in the number of tour-
ists in all Israeli touristic hubs. This result is consistent with the national effect of 
suicide attacks estimated in Table 5. Based on this evidence I reject hypothesis 6, 
since there is no evidence of a stronger local effect of an attack. 
I now proceed to examine the effect of violence on tourist arrival in Palestinian 
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regions. Table 8 reports the results of hypothesis 7 tests that predict that Palestinian 
regions from which suicide attacks originated in month t-1 should host fewer tour-
ists in month t. Column 1 starts with a simple linear regression, without controls 
but with a lagged dependent variable and month dummy. It shows that suicide 
attacks are negatively associated with the subsequent number of tourists, but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Adding control variables (in column 2) and 
region fixed effects (in column 3) do not change these results. I therefore conclude 
that Palestinian attacks against Israelis have no direct relationship with subsequent 
arrivals of tourists to Palestinian regions.
Interestingly, the use of military force by Israel has a negative and statistically 
significant association with the number of tourists. Since military force is often em-
ployed in retaliation to attacks, the relationship between tourism and attack might 
be conditional on Israeli responding with military force. Such a response, rather 
than the attacks themselves, might prevent tourists from arriving. To investigate if 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Suicide attackt-1 -0.09 [0.05] -0.07 [0.04] -0.05 [0.04] -0.21** [0.07]
UnemploymentPALi,t-1  0.12 [0.31] -5.90** [1.51] -5.71** [1.61]
PopulationPALi,t-1 -0.20** [0.07]  1.53 [1.73]  1.63 [1.61]
Settler populationi,t-1  0.01 [0.01]  0.06* [0.02]  0.06* [0.02]
Religious holidayt-1 -0.14** [0.05] -0.18 [0.09] -0.18 [0.09]
Religious holidayt+1 -0.16 [0.09] -0.11 [0.08] -0.11 [0.08]
Electiont-1 -0.04 [0.07] -0.00 [0.12] -0.01 [0.11]
Electiont+1  0.10* [0.04]  0.10 [0.07]  0.10 [0.07]
Positive events in 
negotiationt-1
 0.01 [0.01]  0.04** [0.01]  0.04** [0.01]
Negative events in 
negotiationt-1
-0.06 [0.03] -0.10* [0.04] -0.09* [0.04]
Military force by Israelt-1 -0.03*** [0.01] -0.12** [0.04] -0.14** [0.04]
Military force by Israelt-1 x 
Suicide attackst-1
 0.05 [0.02]
TouristsPALi,t-1  0.92*** [0.03]  0.85*** [0.04]
Constant  0.67** [0.17]  3.94** [0.94] -12.27 [22.86] [21.26]
Month dummies  yes  yes yes
Region fixed effects  no  no yes
R2  0.88  0.89 0.39
No. of obs.  445  440 440
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 8
Suicide Attacks, Israeli Military Response, and Tourism in Palestinian Regions: Region-Level 
Regressions (Hypothesis 7)
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this is the case, on column 4 of Table 8 I interact the attacks variable with the mili-
tary use variable. The overall association between attacks and subsequent tourism 
is the sum of the attack coefficient with the interaction term coefficient.
The results that suggest that when conditioning on the use of military force by 
Israel, suicide attacks are associated with a 21% decrease in the fixed effects model 
(column 2).18 Based on these results, I accept hypothesis 7, but add that the nega-
tive effect of suicide terrorism on tourism in the regions of origin of suicide bomb-
ers depends on a military response by Israel.
Discussion
Tourism is believed to promote peace by reducing poverty, enhancing mutual un-
derstanding, and increasing economic incentives of individuals, groups, and gov-
ernments to maintain peace. Tourism is often proposed as a strategy of conflict 
resolution in several cross-border conflicts. 
However, despite the logical appeal of these proposals, the relationship be-
tween tourism and conflict, and especially the effect of tourism on conflict, has 
been under-studied empirically. 
In this paper, I use data from one conflict—the Israeli-Palestinian case, and 
explore how conflict is associated with tourism. My findings suggest that tourism 
might not be the panacea to solving this conflict. First, despite the initial evidence 
at the macro level that an increase in the number of tourists is associated with 
less violence, this relationship does not hold at a geographically-disaggregate level. 
Specifically, this relationship is not robust when we account for local characteris-
tics of Palestinian communities that might affect the level of violence. Second, the 
assumption that underlies the argument about the pacifying impact of tourism—
namely that tourism is sensitive to violence—is not fully supported by the data 
from this particular conflict. As reported above, the decrease in tourism following 
attacks is short-lived, and sometimes conditional on other factors, such as military 
response by the government. This raises the question of whether temporary loses 
are enough to make it worthwhile for both parties to avoid violence. Thus, in terms 
of policy implications these findings suggest that investing in tourism may not be as 
effective as some people hope for reducing violence and promoting conflict resolu-
tion, at least in the context of this case.
18  These results were obtained using the margins command in Stata that estimates the marginal effect of 
a variable. I also tested a model without region fixed effects, but with a lagged dependent variable, and 
there a suicide attack reduced tourism to regions of origin of the attackers by 7% conditional on a use of 
force by Israel.
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Despite this conclusion, there are several caveats to these findings. First, this 
paper focuses on one case—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and thus it is possible 
that tourism has a different effect in other settings. The benefit of focusing on one 
case is that we can use disaggregated data and explore the relationship between 
tourism and violence in a more nuanced way, and using more consistent defini-
tions of the variables of interest than what is possible in a cross-national dataset. 
The disadvantage of using data from one case is the uncertainty about the external 
validity of the results, and their applicability beyond this particular case. Although 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shares many similarities with other cross-border dis-
putes, the evidence reported here applies only to this setting.19 
A second reason why these findings should not lead us to discard the idea that 
tourism could be useful to mitigate violence is that so far tourism has played a lim-
ited role in the economy of both sides, and especially in the Palestinian economy. 
From 2000 through 2007, accommodation and food services contributed from 
0.5% to 1.2% to the Palestinian GDP.20 In Israel, trade, accommodation, and res-
taurants constituted from 8.5% to 10% of the total GDP in 2000 through 2007.21 
This relatively modest contribution to the GDP, especially in the Palestinian 
side, might explain why we do not detect an effect of tourism on patterns of vio-
lence. It is possible, though, that if the share of tourism in the local economy in-
creases, and if specific arrangements, such as those proposed in Bueno de Mesquita 
(2009) are put in place, both sides would have stronger incentives to refrain from 
violence, and enjoy the profits from tourism.
19  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict evolves around a dispute over territory, and also has ethnic and religious 
dimension, something that is also present in other conflicts, such as the former conflict in Northern 
Ireland, the conflict in Kashmir, or the Turkish conflict with the PKK. Moreover, due to availability of 
data, the Israeli-Palestinian case has been used to explore other questions related to conflict, and les-
sons derived from this setting have later found support in other cases as well. For example, the effect of 
exposure to terrorism on voting has been studied in the Israeli context by Berrebi and Klor (2008) and 
Gould and Klor (2010), and the results were later confirmed also in the Turkish case (Kibris, 2011). 
20  See Table 1-1 in http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1441.pdf and in http://www.
pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1547.pdf. 
21 http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications13/1514/pdf/t15.pdf.
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